Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1969

Armored Motors Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah,
Donald Hacking, Hals. Bennett and Donald T. Adams,
Commissioners of the Public Service Commission of Utah, and
Frank J. Terry, Dba Bus Express Pickup and Delivery Service Co.:
Brief of Plaintiff

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Stuart L. Poelman; Attorney for Plaintiff
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Armored Motors v. Public Service Comm'n, No. 11672 (1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4816

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
ARMORED MOTORS SERVICE,
Plaintiff,

-vs.-

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, DONALD HACKING,
HALS. BENNETT AND DONALD
T. ADAMS, COMMISSIONERS OF
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, AND FRANK J.
TERRY, DBA BUS EXPRESS
PICKUP AND DELIVERY SERVICE CO.,
Defendants.

n

Case No.
11672

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
OF AN ORDER OF THE PUBLIC
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN and
STUART L. POELMAN
7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Armored Motors Service

IRENE WARR
419 Judge Building
Attorney for Defendant
Frank J. Terry, DBA Bus
Express Pickup and Deilvery
Service Co.
H. WRIGHT VOLKER
Assistant Attorney General
-----------State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant
Public Service Commission of Utah, et al.

FILED
-----

... n,o

CJ_.---.-

TABLE OF CONTENrrs
Page

ST ATE ME NT OF KIND OF CASE __ ---------------------

1

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE -------------------------------- ________________

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW ---------------------------- ___ ______________

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS . ____ --------------------------------- _________ ________

3

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------ 10
POINT I. THE RECORD CONTAINS NO SUB ST ANTIAL EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC NEED FOR THE APPLICANT'S PROPOSED SERVICE. --------·----·-------------------------- 10
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE C 0 N CL US IVE LY
SHOWS THAT APPLICANT'S PROPOSED SERVICE
IS NOT ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE. ·--------------- __________________ 20
POINT III. THE APPLICANT FAILED TO SHOW
THAT HE IS FINANCIALLY ABLE TO RENDER THE
SERVICE WHICH HE PROPOSES. -------·---------------·------------------ 24
POINT IV. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
ORDER WAS NOT BASED UPON A PROPER AND LAWFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE. -- ------------------ 27
CONCLUSION -----------------------·-----·-··-------------------·---·----·------------------ 31

TABLE OF CONTENTS-( Continued)
Page
CASES CITED
Fleet Transport Company of Kentucky Inc., Extension, 88
MCC 762 ------------------------------------------------------------------ ------- _______ 13
J. T. Transport Company, Inc. Extension 79 MCC 695

_ 19

Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines v. Hal S. Bennett et al., 8
Utah 2nd 293, 333 P.2d 1061 (1958) -------------------------- ______ 18
Lewis Bros. Stages, Inc. et al. vs. Public Service Commission
et al., 22 Utah 2d 287, 452 P.2d 318 ________________________________ 29
Squaw Transit Company, Common Carrier Application 48
MCC 17 -------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------ 19
Utah Light and Traction Company v. Public Service Commission 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683 -------------------- _______________ . 25
White, Extention of Operations 14 MCC 25 ------------ _______

-- 12

STATUTES CITED
Section 54-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ----------------

- - .. 28, 29

Section 54-6-5 Utah Code Annotated 1953 ---------------- ___________ 13, 25

In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
AHMORED MOTORS SERVICE,
Plaintiff,

-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, DONALD HACKING,
HALS. BENNETT AND DONALD
'l'. ADAMS, COMMISSIONERS OF
'l11IE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISfll ON O:F' UTAH, AND FRANK J.
DBA BUS EXPRESS
PICKUP AND DELIVERY SERVICE CO.,

Case No.
11672

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

OF KIND OF CASE
This case involves an application to the Utah Public
SPrvice Commission by the defendant Frank J. Terry,
dha Bus Express Pickup and Delivery Service Co., for a
Cnrti ficate of Convenience and Necessity which originally
rontt>mplated operations a:s a common carrier by motor
rd1ice for the transportation of packages not to exceed
:if) pounds per package between all points and places
within Salt Lake, Davis, Utah, and Weber Counties, State
of Ftah.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
By its order dated March 7, 1969, the Public Service
Commission of Utah granted to Frank J. Terry dba Bus
Express Pickup and Delivery Service Co., a Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity authorizing Mr.
Terry to operate as a common carrier in intrastate commerce, as follows:
Transportation of general commodities by
motor vehicle over irregular routes between all
points and places in Salt Lake County, and all
points and places in the area of Davis County sonth '
of the Junction of U.S. Highways 89 and 91
north of Farmington, Utah, save and except that
there is excluded from said area that part of 8alt
Lake County which lies west of 4800 West and
south of 1300 South hut tlw an'a to be served shall
include the town of Kearns, Utah; provided further, that no service shall be rendered in the transportation of any package or article 'veighing more
than 50 pounds or exceeding 108 inches in length
and girth combined, and each package or articlf'
shall be considered as a separate and distinct shipment; and pro,-ided further, that no service shall
be provided in the transportation of packages or
articles weighing in the aggregate more than 100
pounds from one consignor at one location to one
consignee at one location on any one day; and
Restricted against the transportation of: (1)
papers, document:",, and written instrn-
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ments as are used in the conduct and operation
of banks and banking institutions; (2) of papers
used in the processing of data by computing machines, punch cards, magnetic encoded documents
and office records, and (3) of eye glasses, frames,
lenses, optical, camera, and hearing aid supplies.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Plaintiff Armored Motors Service seeks this Court's
order setting aside the Commission order granting the
said Certificate of Convenience and Necessity to def endant Frank J. Terry.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Frank J. Terry made application to the
Public Service Commission of Utah on June 12, 1968
t>eeking intra and interstate motor carrier authority for
the transportation of "packages, not to exceed 50 pounds
per package, between all points and places within Salt
Lake, Davis, Utah, and Weber Counties, State of Utah."
(R 428)
At the commencement of the hearing on the application, the area of Utah County was eliminated from the
scope of the authority sought so as to eliminate the threat
of a protest by the Continental Bus System Companies,
Palmer Brothers, Incorporated and Rio Grande Motor-
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ways (R 14). At that time the application was also voluntarily restricted against the transportation of commercial papers, documents, and written instruments as
are used in the condnct and operation of banks and banking institution, certain computer supplies, and certain
optical and hearing aid equipment and supplies. This
restriction eliminiated the protest of Bankers Dispatch
Corporation (R 8).
Then, aftt>r the testimony of the first 22 shipper
witnesses who appeared at the hearing had been taken
and only one shipper ·witness was yet to testify, the application was again voluntarily restricted as to the area
to be sen-ed, the size of the packages to he hauled and
the total weight of the shipments allo-wahle. It 1rns also
agreed that no interntate traffic was to be hauled. rrhese
restrictions were made so as to eliminatP the protest of
Cole Transfer and
Ogden Transfer and Storage, Redman Moving and Storage Company, Barton
'rruck Lines, l\fagna Garfield Truck Lines, Wycoff
Company, Incorporated and Lake Shore Motor Coach
Lines (R. 375-378). The area which was eliminated from
the scope of the application at that time was all of
\Veber County, all of Davis County north of the junction of U.S. Highway 89 and 91 just north of Farmington, Utah, and that portion of Sat Lake County which
lies west of 4800 ·w<'st and south of 1300 South, except
for Kearns, Utah. The size of any packag0 or articlr
to be transporkd by applicant was restricted to a total
of 108 inches in length and girth eornliined and tlw aggrt>-
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gate of any one shipment between any one consignor
at one location to any one consignee at one location on
any one day was restricted to 100 pounds. (R. 376) The
100 pound per shipment restriction was in addition to the
;JO pound per package restriction contained in the original application.
the specific interest of plaintiff Armored
Service was not eliminated by the above describl'd restrictions, it remained as a protestant in the Commission proceedings, cross-examined the final shipper
wii.JH·ss and presentro evidence in support of its protest.
'L'he applicant, Frank Terry, is a full-time bus driver
for Continental Bus Company. (R. 397) In addition,
lw operates a business which he calls Bus Express
Pickup & Delivery Service Company. This business
inrnlves transportation within Salt Lake County
of packages to and from bus tenninals and parcel post to
and from post offices. He also has contract carrier authority to transport commodities for General Motors
Parts Depot in North Salt Lake to bus depots in Salt Lake
County. ( R 35) Mr. Terry's motor carrier service has
hPm operated out of his home with the assistance of
!tis wife (R. 97). His financial statements as of the end
of I 9G7 show that his motor carrier operations were not
profitable and that at the time of the hearing he showed
a ll(c'gative earned surplus of $3,000.00 in spite of the fact
that neither he nor his wife had taken any compensation
t1llt of the busine;;s for their services (R. 396). Mr. Terry
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admitted that his past service involving the delivery of
packages directly from the consignor to the consignee was
"prohibitive costwise" (R 47).
At the commencement of the commission hearing, Mr.
Terry testified that he proposed to expand his present
operations to serve all points in a three county area and
to provide two separate types of service combined under
the same operation. On the one hand, he proposed a direct delivery service which contemplates the picking up
of a package at the business or home of the consignor
and taking that package directly to the consignee without
other stops or reshuffling of freights (R 40). On the
other hand, he intended to initiate what 8hall be referred
to herein as a redistribution type service. The redistribution type service would involve the picking up packages
from various consignors within a given area and taking
them to a warehouse where they would be redistributed
with freight arriving in vehicles from other areas and
reloaded for delivery in other vehicle the follwing a.. m.
or p.m. (R 41).
For the redistribution type service the applicant
proposed to charge a tariff rate ranging from 55c on a
package weighing up to 9 pounds to 85c for a package
weighing up to 50 pounds for the first package, plus an
additional flat rate of lOc for each additional package up
to 10 packages and a flat rate of $1.00 per package for
each additional package over 10 packages (R 50-51). On
the direct delivery type service applicant proposed to
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charge the same rate as the charge for the redistribution
type service plus an additional 30c for packages moving within the same county area, an additional $2.00 for
packages moving between two adjacent counties and an
additional $3.00 for packages moving between two nonadjacent counties ( R75-76).
'l'he applicant claimed to have made a study or smwith foe aid of a friend as to the economical feasibility
of the new service which he proposes, but no written study
ur survey was placed into evidence for examination and
applicant's friend did not testify. In connection with this
stndy, the applicant made no analysis as to cost per trip
or cost per mile (R 98-99), and he admitted that he had
no written or binding lease or purchase agreement for
the warehouse facility out of which he proposed to operatr• (R 102-103).

VPY

The applicant placed into evidence a balance sheet
his financial condition as of November 1, 1968
(Exhibit 1, R 455) from which it was ascertained upon
cross-examination that the accounts and notes receivable
figure of $566.00 constituted a five year old unpaid loan
to a brother (R 80), that the accounts and notes 'receivable
-doubtful figure of $400.00 was probably not collectible
(R 81), that the asset designated as "operating authority" in the amount of $3,000.00 was actually the expense
incurred by Mr. Terry in obtaining his past operating
authorities (R 94), that the $950.00 liability figure designated as notes payable to relatives constituted a four year
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old unpaid obligation of the applicant (R 94), and that
all assets of the appicant, including r0al t'state, antomohiles, and et1uipment were mortgagPd on hank loans or
pledged to the Small Bnsiness Administration on a prior
husirwss loan (R s;n.
The applicant estimated tlmt his initial cost in thl'
first year of 01wration nnd<'r his proposed servic<' would
n•quire a $GO,OOO.OO innstrnent in n<'W vehicles (R 40-±).
Ile admitt0d that his financial condition was such thathe
was not in a position to lmrro,,- lllOm·y (R :-\7-88).
Most of the testimony of supporting shipper witnesses related to their alleged need for service to points outside of the territory encompassed in the application m;
finally restricted and granted by the Co1mnission and
almost withont excPption the wi tnc'sses admitted that
their support of the application \YUS based upon the fact
that the proposed rates to be charged hy the applicant
,,-ere lower than ratPs available from other existing
carriers. The appendix which follows this brief eonsists
of an abstract of the h'stimony of
supporting :;hipper
witness as that testimony relafrd to the witnes8's need for
sen-ice within the area for which authority ,,-as finally
granted
the Commission l>lns tlw mamwr in \d1ielt tlw
flp])lieant':-; proposed rates induePd his support of tl1<' n1 1
]Jlication and the knowledge of the 1\-itn<'ss a:-; to otlwr
available puhlic cnrri('r servicPs which ]H' ('ould
The ahstract is not int rnkd to he a compl('tc> srn11
mnry of all tPstimony.
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The plaintiff Armored Motors Service is best known
as a carrier of coin, currency and other valuables in
annored vehicles. This service is conducted in several
states and in Utah under an exemption in the Motor
Carrier Act. In addition, Armored has been conducting
a package delivery service in Salt Lake County. Authority for this service was acquired from Jiffy Messenger
Service pursuant to approval of the Public Service
Commission dated November 23, 1966 (R 412). This
authority authorizes the plaintiff to operate at a "common carrier by motor vehicle of property in intrastate
eommerce, to and from all points in Salt Lake County,
Utah, over irregular routes, for the transportation of
mE>ssages and packages not exceeding a weight of 100
ponnds per item." (Exhibt 4, R 462)
obtaining its package authority, plaintiff institutt>d a county-wide package delivery service. In doing so,
it employed additional personnel and it purchased five
additional Econovan vehicles specifically adapted for
the package delivery type service (R 414, Exhibits 5 and
6). It employed a traffic solicitor (R 414), distributed
advertising material (R 417 and Exhibit 7), and commenced contacting businesses throughout the county area
to determine the feasibility of a major distribution type
operation (R 416, 421 & 423). However, it was determined
that there was not a sufficient volume of traffic in the
arpa to make feasible, an inunediate full-scale redistribution type operation ( R 417).
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Plaintiff's package delivny service, consists of both
a direct deliY<'l'Y seryice which n•quires at most one honr
of transportation time from tlw consignor to the consignee (R 415) plus a r<>distribntion type service which results
in following day ddiven- (R 41G, 427) . The hnsine:,,;s is
c·onducted thrnugh a terminal and dispatcher locatl>d in
Salt Lake Cit>- (H 415). It clid not show a profit during
Pith<·r of th<' two Yl'ars of its op<>ration up to tlw timP of
the ]1(•aring, hut the volume has lwc>n increasing (H -l-:!4,
S). 'L'he plaintiff's witness (•stimatPs that about a
:2() per cent incn•asP in YO)HllW will fW TI<'Ce::;sary to gPt
t.JH• Operation ''into tJiP hlack" ( n 4:2:1).

POINT I
THE RECORD CONTAINS N"O SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC NEED FOR THE APPLICANT'S PROPOSED SERVICE.

The record clearl>- shows that the shipper witnesses
who testified at t110 Commission hearing in support of t11r
application wPre }Jrimarily interestPd in se1Tic<> to arpas
which are beyond the scope of the avplication as finally
restriefrd and granted and it fnrtlwr clParly sltow8 that
the witnPsse8
induced to support the application h.v
the promis<' of the applicant's proposc•d cliea1wr rates.
Furiht'rmore, th<' rPcord shff\\"":,; tliat all of thP stated
nPPds of the 8npporting shiprwrs ean be nd<><ptat<'ly met
ll:\ tli<· i1rc•'..;ently <·xistin,g pnliliC' motor c::uri<•r
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'l'wenty-two of the twenty-three shippers who support<'d this application did so under the false assumption
that the applicant's operations would involve a three
<'nnnty-wide package distrbution service with only a
iJO ponnd weight per package limitations and certain
co1m11odity restrictions. A review of the record
that those witnesses were primarily interested in
from Salt Lake City to Weber ,County and specifically into the City of Ogden. Also, because the interest
of most of the original protestants to the application centen•d around the W eher County area, the focus of both
(lin'ct and cross-examination "·as on the proposPd inter
county service, and the witnesses showed only passing
interest, if any at all, in the local delin ry service for
w!tieh authority was finally requested and granted. As
a eonsPquence, the testimony as to need for the local
delivery service was onl)· handled as an incidental and
Jle>ripheral issue.
1

Furthermore, all of the said 22 supporting witnesses
wrre cross-examined under the misunderstanding that the
drfondant was offering a complete service over at least
three full counties.

Had both the witnesses and the

protPstants known of the very limited area which was to
hr finally requested and then approved by the Commis'ion, the testimony would in all probability have been
Pntirely different, and the shipper's support of the appl iC'ation would have been extremely questionable. A
n·view of the record shows that most of the supporting
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witnesses were not intereted in a package delivery service
within portions of Salt Lake and South Davis Counties
since they had their own local delivery equipment and
they did not intend to abandon their private local delivery

The record is further ck)ar that the chief inducement
for any of the witnesses to support the application was
the applicant's proffered lower rate structure. The applicant admitted that he had discussed his proposed rates
with the witnesses and committed himself rate-wise to
them (R 70-71). The witnesses were quite candid in admitting that their support of the application was predicated upon the applicant's ability to offer them rates
which were either equal to or lower than the present
parcel post rates or the cost of their private transportation. Yet, the record sho\vs that the applicant's proposed
rates are not economically feasible as will be discussed
under Point II of this briPf and thus the whole basis of
snpport by the shipper witnesses fails.
It has been a long standing rule of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in common motor carrier application proceedings that if the primary advantage to be
gained by the proposed service is a lower rate, the appli·
cation will be denied. (White, Extention of Operations,
14 MCC 25) The reason for such a rule is obvious. Anyone offering lower rates can muster substantial support
for his proposed service even though the identical service
is already available. Since it is in the public interest that
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1·xisting regulated carriers should be allowed to charge
compensable rates in order to secure their continued opL·rations and service to the public, the function of regulating rates has been assigned to the Commission. Thus
l'V!'n if it is maintained that the rates charged by existing
:,;ervices are too high, that fact alone would not justify
the granting of new duplicating authority since any unlawful. rates can be corrected by the Commission. (See
Fleet Transport Company of Kentuck:v, Inc., Extension,
SS MCC 762.) In fact, it would appear that the primary
purpose of rate regulation by the Commission is to eliminate cutthroat price competition so as to securP the stahility of existing Sl'lTices and to insure their continued
to the pnhli<'.
An
('lement to lw considered by the Commisin determining whPtlier or not public convenience
an<l necessity exists for a new proposed service is whether
or not the public is afforded sufficient existing transportation facilties of the type proposed. The Utah Public
Service Commission is specifically charged with considering this issue by the terms of Section 54-6-5 Utah Code
Annotated 1953 which states in part: "Before granting
a certificate to a common motor carrier, the cormnission
flhall take into consideration ... the existing transportation facilities in the territory proposed to be served."
It is abundantly clear from the record in this case
that the public is already afforded a completely adequate
]lnhlic transportation service for the transpo-rtation of
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small packages. The area description finally adopted by
the applicant was that contained in the typical local cartage authorities presently held by numerous othPr companies. The applicant himself admitted that he was
aware that this same authority had be0n issued by the
Commission to 20 different other people or companie:and that 10 additional cartage companies had authorih
which duplicated his applied for authority at least in part
(R 405).
"-as no tPstimony presented to the effect that
u<lt•qnafr common carrier
in Nalt Lake County
was not available. The testimony of the witnesses was
:,;imply that tlwy werP SPPking a sPrvice with lower rateF.
The commission clearly erred in its finding that
"there is not presently any authorized common carrier
who is actively atfrmpting to render service of the type
proposed." (R 493) Since most of the protesting carriers
withdrew from the Commission proceeding prior to the
presentation of their own evidence, the record does not
contain much detail as to their offen•d servicPs, but it can
he ascPrtained from the t0stimony of the supporting shipJl<'rs that a semi-local small package dPlinry is offered
sevPral existing carriers. Mr. Pemhroke testified that
his

is presPntly using tlw services of

City D(•linry Service,

Moving and Storage Com-

pany, and 'Vycoff

Incorporated for delivery

of his packag<>s into Salt Lake and Davis Counties (R 301-
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and Mr. Foster who testified on behalf of the L.D.S.
t'linn·.h admitted that his use of plaintiff's delivery servier· had hN•n satisfactory (R 218).
Since plaintiff did remain in the Commission proce('ding as a protestant, the record does contain evidence
that plaintiff is conducting a package delivery service
11 i lhin 8alt Lake Connty almost identical to the type
1d1i('h the applicant proposes. The applicant admitted
that he would probably not he able to immediately conduct a full-scale high volnme package service but that the
business would liave to grow into 1vhat he ultimately
pro11oses (R 86). This is exactly what the plaintiff has
IJl'en attempting to do since the inception of its service in
latP 19GG (R 41G-417).
'I'he applicant attempted to induce the belief that the
type of service which he proposes is somehow unique in
that it contemplates in part the redistribution of packages
at a warehouse. Not only does the record show that the
Jilaintiff engages in this type of service but the applicant
aihnitted that with respect to the method of handling the
shipment his propos<-'d operation would be no different
than that of the other regular common carriers (R 66).
fn Hildition, l\Ir. Dodge who testified on behalf of Westf'rn

Company, referred to this same type of rel'ling system offerecl by ·wycoff Company, Incorpo1

a h·d (R 17<i).
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As a practical matter, both tlw plaintiff's present
service and tlw applicant's proposed service are substantially identical. Both have roving vans in communication
with a dispatch service; plaintiff operates on a G a.rn.
to G p.m. schedule, six days a wed{, while the applicant
would operate on a 7 a.rn. to 8 p.m. schedule, six days
per
and plaintiff has a consolidation service for
non-rush order items such as the applicant propose:;; to
establish in his warehouse. In essl'nce, both services are
<·ssentially based upon the United Parct>l Service idea.
Admittedly, the Commission is not under a statutory
duty to prevent all competition, but the Commission did
error as noted above in its finding that no presently authorized common carrier is actively attempting to render
the type service which is proposed, and the Commission
further ignored the obvious effect which the diversion of
traffic from the plaintiff's operation would have on the
plaintiff's ability to continue in its efforts to establish
the precise type of service which the Commission feels is
needed.
Mr. DeLue of Armored Motors Service testified that
his

studies slmwed that he could expect a loss

operation for at lPast fin

because of the expensivr

natnrP of the direct delivery service and the initial low
vohune which could

genC'rated for the redistribution

type service. Inspite of this, he entered the field anrl
estahlislwd his opt>ration in late HHHI. As expected, the
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operation showed a loss for both years during which he
operated prior to the Commission hearing, but with a
substantial increase in gross revenue being generated
d nring that period ( R 421-422). In other words, the plaintiff forsaw the initial expense and difficulty involved in
<>stahlishing a full-scale package delivery service in the
Lake Metropolitan area, but he entert>d the field
anyway and ·was, until the granting of this application,
on his way toward establishing such a service.
If the applicant is allowed to Pnter the field in competition with the plaintiff, substantial traffic, both present
and potential, will obviously be diverted from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's efforts to develoii a full-scale and
economical serTice will fail. The Commission's conclusion
that "it does not appear that the proposed service would
l'esult in any substantial divt•rsion of traffic from the
authorized carriers, but that the traffic tendered would
he in lieu of private transportation or parcel post," can't
possibly be based upon either the record or the realities of
husiness life. Since the applicant proposes to offer

the same service as the plaintiff but at lower rates, diversion of traffic from the plaintiff is a foregone conclusion.
Shippers ·will always use the cheaper service, all other
things being equal.
With respect to diversion, the probable effect of
gTanting this authority would be to split the available
lrni'fic bdween the two carriers, both of which are
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attempting to establish the same type of service, and
thus make it impossible for either to economically establish the public service which the Commission is apparently convinced is needed. Certainly if one package
delivery service in Salt Lake Connty cannot yet genPrate sufficient volume to make a profit, the addition
of another such service will simply impose upon the
lmhlic another loss operation. Such cannot be said to
he in the public interest or of public convenience and
necessity.
1'his court has both the legal prerogative and the
duty to overrule the Commission's order when it is
found to be arbitrary and capricious. This court exercised that prerogative in the case of Lakeshore Motor
Coach Lines vs. Hal S. Bennett, et al., 8 Utah 2nd 293,
333 P .2d 1061 (1958). In that case the court made certain statements which seem to fit the fact situation in
the instant cas<>. 1'his court stated at page 1063:
" . . . Proving that public convenience and necessity would be served by granting additional
carrier authority means something more than
showing the mere generality that some members
of the public would like and on occasion use
such type of transportation service. In any populous area it is easy enough to procure
who will say that tl1ev would like to see more
frequent and cheaper· service. That alone
not prove that public convenience and
so require. Our understanding of the statute is
that there should he a showing that Pxistini;
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services are in some measure inadequate, or that
public need as to the potential of business is such
that there is some reasonable basis in the evidence to believe that public convenience and necessity justify the additional proposed service.
For the rule to be otherwise would ignore the
provisions of the statute; and also would make
meaningless the holding of formal hearings to
make such determinations and render futile efforts of existing carriers to def end their operating rights." (emphasis added)
Likewise under Interstate Commerce Commission
law, it is well-established that in order to foster sound
economic conditions in the motor carrier industry, existing motor carriers should nonnally be afforded the
right to transrJort all traffic which tl1ey can handle
adequately,

and economically in the territories

s0rved by them, as against any person now seeking to
enter the field. (See Squaw Transit Company, common
<·arrier application 48 MCC 17 and J. T. Transport Company, Inc., extension 79 MCC 695)
By granting this application, the Corrrmission has
arbitrarily ignored the true public interest. The public
interest dictates that the plaintiff's efforts to develop
a proftable and serviceable package delivery service in
Salt Lake County should receive protection from unwarranted and unnt>eded competition.
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The record does not contain any substantial evidence whatever which establishes a need for the service
which the applicant proposes. Not only does almost all
of the testimony relate to service into areas not now
within the scope of the authority granted, but it is
abundantly clear that public support of the application
eame as a result, not of inadequate existing services, but
rather through the promise by thc> applicant of a cut-rate
servicP. Therefore, the order of the Commission granting the applicant his requested authority was an arbitrary and cavricions act and entire!)- beyond the lawful
discretionary powers granted to the Commission by
statute.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SH 0 W S
THAT APPLICANT'S PROPOSED SERVICE IS NOT
ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE.

Since the rates which the applicant proposes to
charge in connection with his new package delivery
service are significant!)· lower than rates charged by
other existing package delivery services in this area, it
was incurnhent upon thP applicant to show that his proposed service is economieall:· feasible. This he has failed
to do. In fact, a elose

of the evidence of record

shows that the rates proposed hy the applicant are not
r<>alistic and would result in devastating losses.
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At the outset it should be observed that the aplicant did not attempt to show that his proposed rates
were feasible by direct evidence. Any specific figures
n·lativn to revenues and costs were elicited by cross(•x:amination. Whereas the applicant claimed to have
made a study relative to the feasibility of his proposed
service, nothing ·was presented in writing from which
tlw accuracy or authenticity of the study could be determined (R 91) and it became evident through cross(•xamination of Mr. Terry that his estimates were pure
gtH'sses. For example, Mr. 'l'<•rry admitted that he would
have to purchase a forklift, hut the record shows that
la• had not
investigated the cost of a forklift (R 61, 78). Also, Mr. Terry admitted that he had not
attPmpted to det<>1·mine his cost on either a cost per
mile or cost per package basis (R 98, 99). He proposes
to operate out of a warehouse facility in Salt Lake
County at a rental cost of
per month, although
he has no binding lease agreement and he admitted that
the reasonable value of the rent on such a facility is
$900.00 per month (R 102-103).
Even if one were to blindly accept that the applicant
had made a proper study of the feasibility of his proposed service and rate structure, the findings of such a
became entirely irrelevant when the applicant
<·hose to restrict his application against transportation
to most of the area originally contemplated since the
economic feasibility of the large redistribution type
proposed <l<'pends upon the degree of volume of
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traffic which can be generated. '11 he applicant's original
study was for a service as stated in the original application. It contemplated traffic from Weber County,
North Davis County, and all of Salt Lake County which
is not now available (R 398). Likewise, the study contemplated the handling of traffic ·with no per-shipment
weight restriction. 'l'hat restriction limited a volume of
expected traffic. The applicant testified that his proJJOsed service conhm1plated a bns express service in
Ogden hut that JJOrtion of his proposal is also now nna,·ailable to him. Tlrns the applicant has not made any
n·liahlP stn<ly to show that he can in fact profitably
operate his proposed service at the rates which he
proposes and upon which the shipper witnesses based
their support.
Other than haying simply failed to demonstrate
the economic feasibility of his proposed service, applicant
produced evidence through himself and
through his shipper \\itnesses which shows rather conclusively that his proposed service and rate structure is
not economically feasible. The applicant himself estimated that his revrnm• nnder his proposed rates would
awragP 55¢ per paclrnge (R 84). The applicant did not
1>ro,·ide
cost iwr package figure but the applicant's
shippPr witness from Professional Pharmacy testified
as to his cost Pxperience in connection with his own
service and hP stated tliat he ex1wrienced a cost
of approximately $1.00 per dPlivpn· t•ven though he uses
coll('gP stndents working pad-tim(• n+ a lwf.("inning rate of
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$1.25 per hour as drivers and even though his vehicles
consist of a small foreign car and an American compact
car as opposed to the larger truck vehicles which the applicant would use (R 239-241). In addition, Mr. Snow
from Z.C.M.I., who testified on behalf of the applicant,
statPd that his cost per delivery in connection with the
Z.C.M.I. delivery system was between 50c and 75c just
for the vehicle and its driver and not including any
o\·Prhead expenses (R 337).
Thus, if we are to rely upon the revenue and cost
per package figures presented as a part of the applicant's evidence, we can determine that the proposed
service will most likely cost almost twice as much as the
traffic will produce in revenue.
As to the direct delivery portion of the applicant's
proposed service, the applicant's evidence likewise demonstrates the probability of a loss operation. Pursuant
to cross-examination, the applicant admitted that his
tariff for a direct delivery of a package from Salt Lake
City to Farmington, Utah would be about $2.60,
as his cost ·would be about $4.50 (R 403-404).
Plaintiff submits that the Commission acted arbitrarily in not properly considering the economical feasil1ilit)· of the applicant's proposed service based upon the
<'\

idence of record. Admittedly, it is not possible for

the Commission to guarantee the financial success of any

24
newly proposed operation let alone existing operations,
but where the record shows, as it does here, that the
proposed service is based and supported almost entirely
upon a drastic reduction in rates to be charged, the Commission has a duty to determine whether or not the
service as a whole is feasible and if the evidence shows,
as plaintiff believes it does here, that such a service is
not feasible, then the Commission is remiss in its duties
to the public in granting the authority sought.
Certainly the applicant, and the public, as well as
the plaintiff, will be darnaged by allowing the applicant
to initiate his riroposed service. 'l'he applicant's whole
proposal for service is admittedly based upon the United
Parc('l Service concept whid1
operates in larger
population areas in the country (R 115). Yet, United
Parcel has the en tin' accounts of large department stores
(R 92), and the applicant has
no commitment
for such traffic in this area. In fact, the witness from
Z.C.M.I. expressed doubts that it would ever be able to
switch to the use of the applicant's services entirely.
Obviously now that the applicant has substantially reduced the area into which he is to operate, his service
hecomPs of even more limited value to the large department stores who handle deliveries into areas beyond the
applicant's te.rritory.
POINT III
THE APPLICANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE
IS FINANCIALLY ABLE TO RENDER THE SERVICE WHICH HE PROPOSES.
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Another one of the specific elements of a public conwni<>nce and necessity case which the Commis-sion is
directed to consider by the terms of Section 54-6-5 Utah
Cod<'. Annotated 1953, is the financial ability of the applicant. The statute reads in part: "Before granting a
cntificate to a corrunon motor carrier, the Commission
shall take into consideration the financial ability of the
applicant to properly perform the service sought under
the certificate ... " Likewise, this court has specifically
l1eld in the case of Utah Light and Traction Company
I'. Pu7Jlic Service Commission 101 Utah 99, 118 P.2d 683,
that the Connnission must consider the matter of the
financial ability of the applicant. At page 689, the court
stated "that under the law, the Commission should not
issue a certificate to a party financially unable to perform the service permitted. . . " Yet, in the instant
proceeding the Commission has totally ignored the issue
of the applicant's financial ability to perform his proposed service. Nothing is contained in the Commission's
Report and Order on the subject, in spite of the fact
that it became one of the principal contested issues at
the h0aring.
The evidence clearly shows that the applicant is not
capable of financing his proposed service. Upon cross('Xarnination it was shown that his balance sheet (Exhibit
1) containE>d listed assets of a rather questionable nature
and it was further shown that since all of the assets
WPre pledged to other loans, the applicant had no borrowing power. In fact, the applicant candidly admitted that
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lie could not get a loan ( R 87-88). The applicant had no
commitment from any bank or the Small Business Administration for a loan to finance his operation (R 404).
His only possible source of funds were "friends" none
of whom were identified or committed to the investment.
Certainly the fact that the applicant had on his
books an unpaid obligation of $950.00 which had been
ontstanding for four years, plns the showing of a loss
operation in his past carrier business could not be of
any assistanc<> to him in his search for funds. The applicant admitted. that

]w

would incur an initial cost for

truck eqnipnwnt of ahont $GU,000 in the first year, but
he did not show where he \ms going to get the funds to
cover that cost (R 40-1:).
The purpose of having the Commission pass upon
the financial ability of an applicant is obvious. To allow
the initiation of under-financed public services would be
detrimental to the public interest. Plaintiff submits that
the Commission's failure to make any finding on the
issue of the applicant's fitness leaves undetermined an
essential issue which should have been determined and
that by granting the applicant the anthority without a
proper finding of fitness was beyond the authority of the
Commission and tlrns a basis for this court to set aside
the Commission order.
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POINT IV
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDER
WAS NOT BASED UPON A PROPER AND LAWFUL
CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE.

As can be ascertained by a review of the record
and as counsel for the defendant Frank Terry will undoubtedly admit, the Public Service Corrunission hearing
in tltis case was conducted by a hearing examiner with
on!)' one> of the commissioners sitting in to hear the
l'Yidt-nce. Although the transcript of record shows that
both Commissioners Hacking and Adams were present
at the hearing when it commenced, only Commissioner
Adams remained for the hearing. This fact can be deduced by the notation in the record at page 82 to the
t>ffect that Commissioner Hacking had reentered the
hearing room. He remained at the hearing only temporarily howevn.
At the close of the hearing, the examiner stated
that the matter would be taken under advisement. Thereafter, the Commission issued it own report and order
on March 7, 1969 without ever having obtained or review<>d a
of the transcript. A transcript of evidence was never prepared until ordered by the plaintiff pursuant to this proceeding before this Court. Thus
thP decision of the Commission in this case was arhitrarilY bast>d upon the opinion of the hearing examinPr. or the commissioner who attended the hearing.
1
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It could not have been based upon any review of the
evidence by a majority of the commissioners.
Plaintiff submits that in any proceeding before the
Commission where a hearing is held, it is mandatory
that a majority of the commissioners review the evidence either by personally attending the hearing or by
reviewing a transcript of the evidence before a decision
is made. Section G4-1-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amendPd, pro,·ides in part:
" A majority of the commissioners shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of any
business, for the performance of any duty or
for the exercise of any power of the commission;
and may hold hParings at any time or place within or without the state, and any action taken by
a majority of the commission shall be deemed the
action of the Commission . . . Any investigation,
inquiry, or hearing which the Commission has
power to undertake or to hold may be undertaken
or held by or before any commissioner or an
examiner appointed by the commission. All investigations, inquiries, and hearings by a commissioner or an examiner appointed by the commission shall be deemed the investigations, inquiries, and hearings of the commission; and all
findings, orders or decisions madP by a commissioner or an examiner appointed by the commission, ichcn appro'l'l'd a11d confirmed by the commission and filed in its office, shall be deemed
the findings, orders, or decisions of the commission and shall have tlrn samP c•ffect as if originally
madP by the commission." ( <·rnphasis addPd)
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Plaintiff recognizes that Section 54-1-3 Utah Code
cbmotated 1953 provides that the Commission may utilize one commissioner or an examiner to conduct its
hearings. That statute, however, does not allow the one
commissioner or the examiner to make the ultimate decision in any case. The Commission is an appointed body
\\'ith the responsibility of acting in response to the needs
of the public and Section 54-1-3 reserves to the entire
Commission the right of issuing the final decision or
order in each case. The section provides that all findings, orders, and decisions made by an examiner become
the order of the Commission only "when approved and
confirmed by the commission". It is axiomatic that the
Commission cannot "approve and confirm" and examinPr's recommendation unless it can review a transcript
of the evidence upon which the recommendation is based
anymore than this court is capable of properly reviewing and either setting aside or affirming the order of
the Commission without the aid of a transcript.
This matter is not new to the Commission or to
this court. In the recent case of Lewis Bros. Stages, Inc.,
et al. vs. Puhlic Service Commission, et al., 22 Utah 2d
452 P .2d 318, decided on March 24, 1969, this Court
sPt aside the order of the Commission which granted
Wycoff Company, Incorporated certain motor carrier
a11tltority and ordered the Commission to complete and
l'<'Yiew a transcript of the evidence before issuing an
onler. Plaintiff submits that there is no significant
llifforence between the procedure of the Commission in
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that case and the instant case. It is essential to fundamental principles of justice that whenever an administrative body utilizes the services of a hearing examiner
in connection with its judicial function, a transcript of
the evidence must be made available to those officers
of the administrative body charged with the responsibility of making the ultimate findings and issuing th<>
ultimate order.

It is the practice before the Interstate Commerce
Commission that where a hearing examiner is utilized,
a transcript of the hearing is prepared for review by
the body authorized to make the ultimate decision. This
procedure is not ne\\r nor is it foHowed just by federal
agencies.

T11t>

proper use of hearing examiners is wrll-

established and is in fact a procedure used by the Utah
Industrial Commission relative to workman's compensation hearings. The Industrial Commission follows the
<:•stablished practice of obtaining a transcript of hearings
for

bv the Commissioners in any case heard by

either an examiner or by one of the commissioners. In
addition, this writer has had the recent opportunity of
participating in proceedings before the Wyoming Public
Service Commission and it

\YaS

noted that that com-

mission also follows the standard practice of requiring
a transcript of the hearing to be prepared in advance of
any decision hy that commission.

:11

Thus the practice of securing a transcript of the
1•vidence prior to an ultimate decision by the Commission
1rhere the services of a hearing examiner are utilized is
not uncommon or unreasonable. If anything, it results
in a more accurate and reasonable decision at the Commission level and it probably reduces the number of
eases brought before this Court involving a review of the
Commission's orders. But more than being desirable,
it is essential to fairness. An order approved by the
rnajority of the Commissioners, without the opportunity
to review the transcript of evidence in cases where a
hearing examiner is utilized, obviously is arbitrary and
tlw true decision-making function of the Commission
is abandoned.
A proper comparison of the instant case with a
court proceeding would be a case where a jury assigns
to a third person, the duty of hearing the evidence and
then telling the jury how to decide the case. In such an
instance, this Court would have little difficulty in finding that the jury had not properly assumed its function
and that the legal right to trial by jury had been denied.
It is just as logic.al for this Court to find that the
Public Service Commission, the legally authorized tryer
of fact, cannot assign to a third person its responsibility
to ultimately decide the case.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the order of the Commission
(·ntere<l in this case on March 7, 1969 is arbitrary and
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capricious and not supported by substantial evidence.
The record clearly shows that there was no real public
support for a package delivery service in the area of
that portion of Salt Lake and South Davis Counties for
which the applicant was nltimately granted authority,
since 22 of the 23 supporting shipper witnesses testified
·with the false understanding that the services of the
applicant would be a three county wide service and their
stated need for service was primarily into areas not now
C'overed by the granted certificate.
The reeord also shows that the shipper witnesses
,,·ere induced to testify in support of the application by a
promise of low<,r rates than those of existing carriers,
not hecanse there was any dt:>ficiency in the services of
presently authorized carriPrs.
In addition, the Commission arbitrarily ignored the
evidence with respect to the economical feasibility and
the financial fitness of the applicants since a careful
review of the record shows rather conclusively that the
applicant's proposed service is not economically feasible
nor is the applicant possessed of sufficient assets or
credit to properly estahlish and finance his proposed
operation.
Finally the Commission's order is arbitrary and
capricious and not based upon the evidence since the
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majority of the Commissioners have never had the opportunity to review the evidence.
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to set aside

the Commission order.

Respectfully submitted,

Stuart L. Poehnan of
Worsley, Snow & Christensen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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APPENDIX
ABSTRACT OF SHIPPER
"WITNESS TESTIMONY
1. Martin Gladowski - Regional Sign Company,
Salt Lake City, Utah. Testimony related to service from
Salt Lake City to Ogden. No discussion was had as to
need in Salt Lake and Davis Counties. The witHe1:l1:l admitted that his needs had been met, but ''they
('oul<l he met at a more economically (sic) price." (R 127)
'.2 Jay Winger -

Sperry-Rand Corporation, Salt
Lake City, Utah. Mr. \Vinger stated that his company
has a fleet of approximately 15 trucks in operation for
<lPlivery service. As to service within the Salt Lake City
area, applicant's proposed service would only be used
on an emergency basis after 3 :00 p.m. (R 141-142) As
to local deliveries, he stated that the company's own
tnick service would be discontinued only if defendant's
l'inally-published rates were lower than Sperry-Rand
( 'orporation could possibly run their own trucks (R 135,
L±0, 143). Wlwn asked if the Armored Motors delivery
'''rYice had been satisfactory, Mr. "Winger stated speriLca1ly one instance on October 30, 1968, that delivery
took 24 hours (R 144-146). Later, Mr. DeLue of the
Armored Motor Service testified that he made an inwstigation into the aforementioned delay and discovered
that th0 drivrr who would have made the delivery was
in tliP hospital and that Sperry-Rand had been informed
ri[' tJ1P conf'eqnent delay. (T 422)
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3. Neil B. Peterson - Homelite, North Salt Lake,
Utah. Mr. Peterson stated that practically all of his shipments are outbound with most of them going into other
states and very little local business (R 151). He stated
that Wycoff service is "very, very good," and parcel
post service was convenient to him and "very good." His
only support of the application was for a cheaper method
of getting packages from his business to the bus depol
(R 152)
4. Richard "\V. Crouch - Carr Printing Company,
Bountiful, Utah. Mr. Crouch stated that his company
now delivers with its own truck. He indicated that Wycoff service had been used with good results (R 160),
but the proposed rates by defendant would be a "major
factor" in his support of this application (R 162).
5. Al C. Dodge - vV estern Electric, Salt Lake City,
Utah. Mr. Dodge stated that his company now uses
Telephone Company trucks for 95 percent of shipments
within Salt Lake, Davis and Weber Counties (R 169).
The main testimony concerned delivery from the Western Electric plant in Salt Lake to Weber County and
specifically Ogden, Mr. Dodge admitting that his only
need was for direct delivery on an emergency basis since
Wycoff has a reshuffling system and offers otherwise
satisfactory service (R 176). He also stated that on
emergency shipments within Salt Lake City that Redman
and other cartage carriers in the area have given satis-
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factory service, although lw objected to their cost as
comparecl with defendant's proposed rates (R 173).
(i. Walter G. Koplin - Salt Lake Hardware, Salt
Lak<> City, Utah.
Koplin stated that within the
Un·nter 8alt Lake area that his company delivered on
t!JPir own truck. Ile statecl that presf'nt services in the
an'a met his needs, "except for the cost." (R 189) Mr.
Koplin 's primary concern as evidenced throughout his
"·as that of cost.

7. Edward L. Evans - Strevell-Patterson Hardware and Motor :Mere, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Evans
stated that the company's own vehicles are used in the
;-)alt Lake area. His testimony in the main concerned
dt•liveries into the Ogden area. However, he stated that
within Salt Lake County he has used ·wycoff Company
rlPJi,·eries, hut "the rates that he has proposed here
would probably cause us to ship most of the small packages under this 50-pound rate by Terry. In most cases
it 'Xould divert from ·wycoff service or the bus service."
(R 202) Mr. Evans stated that he definitely was not
t·1msidering the discontinuance of use of his own trucks
in this area, even for delivery of small packages. (R

8. Bobby Lee Foster -

L.D.S. Church, Salt Lake

Utah. Mr. Fostf'r stated that the Church presently
11st•s

its own trucks and does not intend to eliminate
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them and that his support of the application is contingent upon the rates to be charged by the applicant.
His testimony was :

"Q. So, when it finally gets down to the nutcracking, we get do"\\rn to the rate
A. Well, that is true.

Q. And if the rate structure he proposes is not
approved by the Commission, then your support of his application fails?
A. Well, taking all things into consideration, if
his rate structure fails, then his whole program fails, doesn't iU
Q. Correct. And your support fails; isn't that

A. Well, that is true." (R 216)
As to service, Mr. Foster readily admitted that delivery within the Salt Lake City area by Delivery Service (Armored Motors Pickup and Delivery Service) has
been both direct and fast (R 218).
9. Boyd Openshaw -

Fred A. Carleson Company,

Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Openshaw stated that he
hadn't attempted in past months to get same-day de-
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livery in Salt Lake County by any of the carriers
presently serving because his company presently uses
their own delivery truck (R 228, 230). Again, defendant's
proposed rate was the dominating factor in inducing
.\[r. Openshaw to testify:
"A. Yes; this is true. This is what this brought
to light was the cost on some of these small
shipments in Salt Lake County, that I can't
perform the service myself by the same cost
as proposed in this deal he's going after.
Q. And so in the event he is not able to perform this at the cost represented to you, then
-and he would have to perform at a greater
cost, let's say at a cost equal to what you can
perform it yourself, then you have no need
for his service in Salt Lake County 1

A. If it was this high, that would be trne, I
wouldn't need it.
Q. And so whether or not you can actually support him depends on ultimately what the cost
is going to be to you.

A. Yes; that cost has a big factor in it." (R 231)
1[r. Openshaw stated that he had not ever attempted to

nse the Plaintiff's delivery service (R 231, 232).

VI
10. John Italsano - Professional Pharmacy, Salt
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Italsano presently makes prescription deliveries in a small foreign car and an American
compact car. He also utilizes college students part time
at a beginning rate of $1.25 per hour to make his deliveries. ·with these economies, he stated that deliveries
still cost him approximately $1.00 per delivery, and that
defendant's proposed rates are still ower than the cost
of his own delivery system. (R 239-241) It is reasonably
inferred from l\Ir. Italsano's present operations and the
vury nature of his hnsi:ness that only direct deliveries
w<:>re contemplated.
11. Arthur Holmg1en -

Ipco Hospital Supply, Salt
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Hohng-ren was interested in delivery into the Ogden area. He stated that he had his own
delivery operation in the Salt Lake and Bountiful ar(•a
and had no plans to discontinue it (R 246, 247).

12. L. A. Marshall - Apex, Inc., Salt Lake City,
Ctah. Mr.· Marshall was mainly desirous of speedy service into the Ogden area (R 259). Again, this witness
also had no intention to replace his own truck for delivery service in Salt Lake County, and only contemplated defendant's proposed service to supplement his
own if he got into a pinch (R 269). Cost also was a major
factor in inducing him to testify.

13. Roger E. Mellor - Vv estnghouse Electric Supply, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Mellor was primarily interesh•d in the longer haul shipments. He stated that he
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nsed his own equipment in Salt Lake County, and evidenced no disposition to discontinue use of such equipnwnt for local deliveries (R 275). Cost also was "appealing." (R 275).
14. Raymond Peterson - Billinis Distributing, Salt
Lake City, Utah. -When confronted with the fact that
Wycoff service is presently available in Salt Lake County
1vith store door pickup, if requested, Mr. Peterson stated:

"Q. But, if that service were available as I have
outlined, that would obviate the need for the
Terry Service, wouldn't
A. Well, this is right, because it is basically a
comparable service, and they have done a fine
job when ·we haYe nsed them." (R 286-287)
jfr. Peterson talked in terms of service into the Ogden
area. He owns his own trucks for delivery in the Salt
' Lake metropolitan area.

15. \Voodrow "\V. Marshall - Pembroke Company, Salt
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Marshall stated that he is primarily
interested in the Davis County area service if such service could be purchased at a cost less than he could
proyide it (R 295). He admitted that he would continue
to perform his own delivery service in Salt Lake County
unlPss defendant could provide at least comparable ser\'i('t' at a cheaper cost than he could perform himself (R

).
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16. Adrian H. Pembroke - A. H. Pembroke Company, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Pembroke stated that
he is presently using the local delivery servces of Cardall
City Delivery Service and Eagle Moving and Storage
Company but he desires the same type of service at a
better rate. He expressed the desire for additional competition because "His price schedule looks better than
that we are paying now, and to be able to move to Davis
and Weber might have some real benefits for us." (R
301)
17. Douglas L. Elton - Stevens-Brown Sporting
Goods Company, Sugarhouse, Utah. Mr. Elton stated
that his company used parcel post and sometimes their
own salesmen deliver in Salt Lake County (R 316). He
was not aware of anyone who offered delivery service
within Salt Lake County, and had not used any other
local package delivery service. (R 318-319)
18. Gordon W. Snow - Z.C.M.I., Salt Lake City,
Utah. Mr. Snow stated that Z.C.M.I. presently delivers
packages from its stores in downtown Salt Lake, at the
Cottonwood Mall in Salt Lake County, and in Ogden,
Utah by means of its O\Vn fleet of trucks. Mr. Snow
estimated that his cost per package per delivery was
50-75 cents just for the vehicle and its driver, and excluding overhead expenses. (R 337) His real interest was
defendant's proposed rate schedule. He envisioned use
of defendant's proposed service only to handle his overflow deliyeries on Christmas and the like, and was un·
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\rilling to commit himself to any complete changeover.
(R :3:38) His testimony was given under the assumption
that defendant could offer services into North Davis and
Weber Counties rather than to just South Davis and
Salt Lake Counties. Moreover, if the rates proposed by
defendant were higher, Mr. Snow indicated his company would not be interested in the applicant's service
(R :3:35).
19. Steven A. Hales - Mack Trucks, Inc., North
Salt Lake, Utah. Mr. Hales was only interested in deliYeries outside of Salt Lake County. 'Vhen asked if he
had need for any kind of transportation service within
Salt Lake County, he answered:
"A. No, not within Salt Lake County.

Q. And that would cover the entire county of
Salt Lake7
A. Yes, uh-huh." (R :344)

20. Chris Dokas - Alernite Sales, Salt Lake City,
Utah. l\Ir. Dokas indicated that his firm presently has
no private delivery service. He was interested in inexpensive deliverv service but was not aware that any
delivery
service was available in the city at all
l iacka<re
b
•
(It 359). Mr. Dokas therefore was not aware even of
what other local cartage companies charged for package
delinn-y service, but was very interested in cost con(R :360).
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21. Mike Sergetakis - Silver State Supplier, Salt
Lake City, Utah. Mr. Sergetakis's testimony was also
given upon the false assumption the applicant would
make deliveries of small packages throughout the three.
county area in question. His support of the application
also was because defendant's rate schedule was approximately 30 percent less, in his opinion than other carriers.
(R 3G7) There was no cross-examination.
22. Reginald Gmne - Rocky Mountain Machinery
Company, Salt Lake City, Utah. Mr. Grane's testimony
can be summed up by quoting an exchange by himself
and Mr. Richards:
"Q. Mr. Grane, are you the gentleman who appeared in the \:Vycoff hearing?
A. You bet.
Q. And do you recall your testimony at that time
that so far as Salt Lake County is concerned
your company has no need for a transportation
A. We have no need for it under the concept of
a regular pickup and delivery service. If
is something special it might be interesting.
Now, whether it would or not, I don't lmow.
As I say to have to call someone to comr
out and pick something up and deliver it, I
don't think I am interested in that, because
we have our own picknp and delivery service.

XI
Q. So that you would adhere to the same philosophy today as you did in the Wycoff hearing,
that within Salt Lake County you are not
supporting the
A. I am not supporting the application for Salt
Lake County." (R 37 4-375)
23. Harold Massett - Red Wing Shoe Company,
Salt Lake City, Utah. He testified that no difficulties
11-pre encountered with parcel post service as to rates
(R 384, 386). He presently uses the delivery service of
\Yycoff Company for small orders and could not say
how the rates of -Wycoff on small packages compare to
the applicant's rates (R 386). His support of the application is based on the 55¢ per package rate quoted to him
by the applicant (R 387).
1

